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At the birth of the United Nations there was unanimous agreement 
on the idea that tire Security Council should he made supreme guard 
of the maintenance of collective security. Relying on the cooperation 
of the great powers firmly established during the War and on the cohesive 
force of the anti-Fascist coalition those launching the United Nations 
were looking forward with great expectations to tire operation of tire new 
institution.
It would, however, be wrong to regard the period of the formu­
lation of the UN Charter and its approval as one of rose-coloured illu­
sions, wholly free of conflicts. Responsible statesmen, before all the 
representatives of tire Soviet Union, were fully aware of the latent 
controversies which had made their effects felt already during the War 
and which canre to light ever more markedly in the period following upon 
the Yalta Conference. The principal source of the controversies was the 
parallel coexistence of a that time only socialist state and the capi­
talist world system, in addition at that time already the process set in 
of the disintegration of the colonial system and also the interests of the 
developed capitalist states began to run counter one another.
I f  this was the state of affairs, was the optimism permeating the 
UN Charter justified at all? Or, if the question is put in a cruder form, 
were the lofty ideas and provisions really meant to cover up the 
hypocrisy of the makers of the Charter ?
In our opinion, the road outlined by the Charter for the progress of 
mankind will, if viewed in the light of the war-time coalition and coo­
peration and of the ideas of democracy matched against Fascism, appear 
to be a quite realistic one. At the same time in view of the controversies 
at that time already perceivable and of the dissenting opinions, guarantees 
before all the principle of the unanimity of the great powers, had to be 
taken up in the Charter which would come into action as soon as flaws 
would appear in the harmony as imagined.
As confirmed by historical development guarantees were in fact 
badlv wanted, in particular with the advent of the period of the cold 
war.
1 1 *
It is beyond the scope of the present study to analyze and explore 
the long complexity-loaded historical period, in a somewhat slipshod 
manner and inaccurately called the period of the cold war. with any 
pretence to scholarliness. We cannot even set as a goal the particularly 
thorough study of the reflection of the cold war in the Security Council. 
However, relying on the well-known facts we may even so advance the 
statement that the first years of the cold war, and then later the Korean 
conflict grown to a veritable war. shattered the expectations which the 
governments and peoples of the United Nations, ftom the birth of the 
Moscow Declaration till the signature of the United Nations Charter in 
San Francisco, cherished for the creation of a system of collective se­
curity.
For the advent of the cold war the imperialist world system, above 
all the United States of America, is responsible. The policy purposing 
the prevention of the expansion of socialism made its deAid. Every pos­
sible means was used to roll back the progressive forces, to oust them 
from the governments, as in France and Italy, even such as were not 
short of open intervention (e.g. in Greece). This western policy of force 
with predilection banked on the atomic monopoly. By the side of Mar­
xist criticism, western historians, among them Americans, recognize this. 
As a pioneer work that of Professor Fleming excels.' This author, other­
wise not a Marxist one, demonstrates that the roots of the cold war go 
back to 1917, the October Revolution. He traces the whole path of 
western hostility and lack of understanding, in particular after the 
Second World War, back to this event. The liberal and leading generation 
of American historians of today, even if it does not adopt Fleming's 
school of thought stamped by it as "revisionist" wholesale, lay the blame 
equally on both parties, like e. g. Arthur Schlesinger," this prominent 
theorist of the Kennedy era.
We cannot, however, be oblivious of the fact that in American 
public opinion it is still the dominant belief that the alleged aggressivitvof 
Soviet foreign policy accounts for the change in American foreign policy."
When for our part we lay the blame on the policy of western capita­
lism. we have to answer the question of what the effect of Stalinist 
dogmatism and leadership methods was on Soviet foreign policy. I f  we 
consult western sources, even in the work of George F. Kennan, this 
excellent diplomat and scholar, who by the way was United States am­
bassador in Moscow, we shall find passages like the following: "In the 
face of these frustations, Stalin's last years were ones of increasing mad­
ness and sterility. His thoughts on foreign policy tended to the reliving 
of old situations"/
On the other hand several bourgeois historiographs come to con­
clusion defeating Kennan's opinion. The professor in charge of the Rus­
sian research centre of Harvard University, states that Soviet foreign 
policy, up to 1953, the year of Stalin's death, relied on the principle of 
peaceful coexistence. Among others he refers to a statement Stalin made 
to -James Reston, of the New York Times, in December 1952, when he
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pointed out the need for putting un end to the Korean war, and even 
spoke of a possible meeting with the newly elected President Eisen­
hower.s
On analyzing the international situation in the years following upon 
the War and the policy of the great powers the statement may he brought 
forward that as a matter of course the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, 
and later on that of the young socialist countries, was of a defensive 
character: it served the preservation and the reinforcement of the 
positions of socialism. At the same time, as has been demonstrated by 
the documents of the international labour movement and also revealed 
bv the proceedings of the XXtli and X XIInd congresses of the Com­
munist Party of the Soviet Union, in matters of foreign affairs the pe­
riod was not quite blameless."
In the first place in the practice and methods of political work 
there were examples of a dogmatic attitude. Rigidity, the relative 
narrowing down of the elbow-room for manoeuvring, the use of an often 
insulting, and by no means convincing tone, the relative want of re­
course to mutually beneficial compromises 01 the endeavour to estab­
lish personal contacts, all this hampered the unfolding of efficacious 
diplomatic work in the socialist countries. Notwithstanding these ad­
verse svmptoms the student of this period cannot be oblivious of the 
enormous difficulties amidst which Soviet diplomacy, and also that of 
the socialist countries had to transact their business in particular in the 
opening years of the 'fifties. Difficulties were particularly great in the 
relatively new field of multilateral diplomacy, viz. in the United Nations 
Organization, and within it, in the Security Council, where a policy 
tending towards the isolation of the socialist countries was even more 
manifest.
As regards UNO as a whole, the political preponderance of (lie 
imperialist states and the spirit of cold war made themselves felt in the 
following principal trends, till the beginning of the 'sixties, and in some 
of them, even to this date:
Frustration of the universality of the world organization by the 
exclusion of the People's Republic of China and a number of socialist 
countries, so as regards Hungary until 1955, and China, until 1971.
On the political plane direct confrontation in the various principal 
agencies of the UN, as was the case with the "financial crisis" emerged 
in the X IX th Session.
On the constitutional plane tendencies to curb the competence of 
the Security Council, to expand the functions of the General Assembly 
in a manner contrary to the Charter through the expropriation of the 
Secretariat, the specialized agencies and technical aid.
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o) In 1916 the Iranian question opened the series of questions 
giving occasion to anti-Soviet representations. When in Mav 1946 the 
Soviet forces were withdrawn from Iran the discussion of the question 
was adjourned -sioc die. Negotiations in the Council between 1946 and 
1949 in matters of disarmament purposing both the reduction of tradi­
tional armaments and the exploitation of subatomic energy for peaceful 
purposes, were abortive.
In 1950 the so far greatest political crisis of the United Nations 
broke out in connexion with Korean War. As the outcome of the Korean 
war many other questions were debated on in the Security Council, so 
the complaint of the People's Republic of China concerning the armed 
invasion of Taiwan by the United States forces. The complaint was 
discussed by the Council in August — November, 1950. At the same time 
the Soviet Union wanted to have the United States aggression against 
China taken up on the agenda as a separate item. In the summer of 
1952 the United States moved the delegation of a committee of inquiry 
to carry through investigations in the question on "alleged bacteriolo­
gical warfare", then on the agenda. This inquiry did, however, never take 
place.
In September 1954 a United States complaint was brought before 
the Security Council on an assault against American airplanes.
In 1955 New Zealand moved that the Security Council should inquire 
into the "armed conflict" between the People's Republic of China and 
the socalled Republic of China.
Hv the side of Asia Europe remained the principal area of con­
frontation.
As early as January 1946 on the motion of the Soviet Union the 
Security Council discussed the interference of British troops stationed 
in Greece in the domestic affairs of the country. In August 1946, on the 
motion of the Ukraine, the attitude of the Greek government to Albania 
was brought up for discussion. In December 1946 the Greek government 
charged the Northern neighbour of Greece with supporting the partisan 
movement. In 1947 there were a number of debates on Greece in the 
Security Council.
In March 1948 on the ¡notion of Chile the socalled "Czechoslovak 
question" was brought up for discussion. The Soviet Union prevented a 
committee of inquiry from being sent to the country and the new Czecho­
slovak government declared that the motion of Chile was an interference 
in the domestic affairs of the country.
Pro]u September 1948 till May 1949 on the initiative of the United 
Kingdom, France and the United States the Security Council dealt 
with the Berlin quest ion, or more explicitly the Berlin blockade, on 
several occasions.
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[n the series of matters indicating the confrontation of the two 
worid systems the Hungarian question was the last, and perhaps the most 
remarkable, t he Security Council debated on the "Hungarian question 
in the wake of ttie counter-revolution between October 27 and November 
5, 1956. Since attempts of an intervention were frustrated in the Security 
Council, the matter was brought up in the second extraordinary session 
of the General Assembly (It should be noted that the political analysis of 
the debates on the "Hungarian question" in tlie Lnited Nations, also on 
grounds of international law, would require a special study.)
AJ In addition to cases put on the agenda of the Security Council 
there was yet another question on which the two worid systems were 
unable to agree, namely that of the election of the non-permanent 
members of the Council.
As one of the final products of the gradually withering positive 
effect of the cooperation of the great powers in the beginning an agree­
ment was reached on the distribution of the non-permanent memberships 
on the Security Council. It was an unwritten agreement, a "gentlemen s 
agreement", as in general termed in professional literature. Accordingly 
of the six seats in the Council two were allotted to the Latin Americas, 
each a seat to Western and Eastern Europe, the British Connnonwelth 
of Nations, and the Near East. At that time there was hardly an Afro- 
Asian state among the 51 states members, and even these few were 
members of the British Commonwealth.
No sooner the gentlemen's agreement began to operate than after 
the lapse of a year or two the Western powers and their allies infringed it, 
as a matter of course much to the prejudice of the eastern European group 
of countries. When at the end of 1974 the mandate of Boland, the first 
Eastern European non-permanent member, expired, the applicant 
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic could hardly hold its own against 
the competing India. In the beginning of the 'fifties the Western Europ­
ean—Latin American voting machinery secured the seat reserved for 
Eastern Europe for Greece and turkey, from  1955 onwaids, when the 
Philippines and Japan occupied this seat, the situation became even 
worse. Eater the system of divided membership became establishedto 
the prejudice of East-European countries. This was of course a violation 
of the Charter. It was in this period that even after ten to twenty vo- 
tess none of the candidates could secure the statutory two thirds majo­
rity. Jhen one of the candidates generallywithdrew with the piomisctobc 
given the seat in the following year. It was in this way that Poland 
shared the two-year's mandate with Turkey, Rumania with the 1 liilip- 
pines, then Czechoslovakia with Malaysia.
The representative of the United States, in an arrogant manner, 
offered as an explanation for the discrimination to the prejudice of the 
socialist countries that the unwritten agreement was valid for the first 
election to the Security Council only, and that the East European govern­
ments do not contribute either to the peace or to the security. Therefore, 
in his view, they should not have any advantage over other states."
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The actual practice did not only ignore the legitimate claims of the 
socialist countries: in its then set-up the Security Council failed to meet 
the demands even of the Afro-Asian group. B y 1963 of the 107 states 
members 57 belonged to the Afro-Asian group, (Taiwan and South 
Africa excluded) a number in excess of the total number of states members 
at the creation of the UN. The voices demanding the increase of the num­
ber of members of the Security Council, and so also of the Economic and 
Social Council, this other important agency of the UN. grew stronger and 
stronger. The number of seats could not be raised unless the Charter had 
been amended accordingly. In point of principle the Soviet Union and 
the socialist countries sponsored the demand of the Afro-Asian coun­
tries, but in view of the indispensable amendment of the Charter asked 
these countries for their patience. Since by Article lU8 for the amendment 
of the Charter the ratification by the permanent members of the Security 
Council was needed, owing to the exclusion of the People's Republic of 
China from the UN, the vote of Taiwan was to be ensured. It was Pared 
that by this a dangerous precedent would have become established, as 
this was the first, and since then the most important case of an amend­
ment of the Charter. The delegates of the socialist countries, among them 
also those of Hungary, in the Special Political Committee of the X VH Ith 
Session of the General Assembly emphasized that the proper course 
would be if  in the matter of the increase of the number of members the 
Security Council decided in the presence of the People's Republic of 
China, or at least with her clear-cut consent. When on the question of the 
increase of the number of nonpermanent seats the delegations of the 
socialist countries voting in want of a clear-cut consent of China ab­
stained the Chinese press laid to the charge of the Soviet Union and 
the socialist countries that they did not support the cause of the Afro- 
Asian countries. Notwithstanding this charge the Soviet Union and the 
socialist countries were the first to ratify the amendment of the Charter.
In accordance with the amendment the number of non-permanent 
seats on the Security Council has been raised from six to ten, and the 
number ol votes required for a valid resolution from the earlier seven 
to nine. Drawing the lesson from the experiences with the "gentlemen's 
agreement" the General Assembly has taken the distribution of the 
seats in its hand. Accordingly five seats have been allotted to the African 
and Asian states, a seat to an Eastern European, each two seats to the 
Latin Americas and the Western European and other states (e.g. Canada, 
Australia, etc.). I he position of the socialist countries has not improved 
in any noteworthy wav, perhaps only in so far as their earlier seat is now 
firmly guaranteed.
The period of political conflicts and cold war problems did not 
come to an end for good in 1956. We refer to the complaint filed by the 
Soviet Union in the Security Council on account of the flight of US 
aircraft equipped witli nuclear weapons over the territory of the Soviet 
Union. Although the United States interference into the domestic affairs 
of the Dominican Republic had not had its origin in the controversies
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of the two world systems, there were nevertheless sharp clashes between 
the United States and the Soviet Union in the Security Council for 
practical purposes without a palpable result. The Security Council was 
turned into the scene of the revival of the cold war in August 1968 on 
the occasion of the Czechoslovak crisis.
However, from the closing years of the 'fifties and the opening 
years of the 'sixties onwards two processes and changes taking place in 
world politics began to manifest themselves also in the United Nations. 
The one was the the shift of the balance of power of the two world 
systems in favour of the socialist countires, the other was the liquidation 
of the colonial system, the mass appearance of the countries newly 
become independent countries in the United Nations and their growing 
importance in world affairs. In the following section we shall deal with 
the new countries emerging from a colonial status in their relation to the 
Security Council.
3. 7'Ae di.sbdeyivi/ion q / ¿Ac co/mwd a.y re/YcVed
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From the very first days of the birth of the Security Council to the 
latest day there were continually items on the agenda standing for 
the landmarks in the history of the movements of national liberation and 
the liquidation of colonialism.
As early as on the 21st January, 1946, i.e. only four days after taking 
up its operation the Security Council, on the iniative of the Ukraine, 
put on the agenda the Indonesian question. It is worth while to mention 
that the Security Council rejected both the Ukranian motion on the 
delegation of a fact-finding committee and the Egyptian motion to 
prohibit the use of British armed forces against the Indonesian forces 
of national liberation.
Between 1947 and 1949 the Security Council dealt on several occa­
sions with the Indonesian question, and the debate and so also the reso­
lution finally passed were instrumental in forcing the Netherlands to 
yield to realities and call off the colonial war. What was noteworthy was 
that hostilities ceased and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
was born in the presence of the military observers of the UN.
When now the two great sets of problems as the outcome of the 
liquidation of colonialism indirectly responsible for permanent crises in 
the Near East and the Indian Sub-continent are for the time being 
ignored there still remain the following cases of major importance in the 
field under study:
In 1952 and 1953 the positions of the Western powers, in the first 
place of France, were still very strong in the Security Council to prevent 
the cases of Tunisia and Morocco from being put on the agenda. However, 
Algeria was on the agenda of the Security Council ever since 1955 until 
the recognition of her independence. Meanwhile again a complaint of 
Tunisia came up before the Security Council, namely that on account of
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the bombing raid in the region of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. in 1961 the French 
aggression in the region of the naval base of Biserta had to be dealt with. 
Even if the debate in the Security Council failed to bring about a change 
in the course of French politics, indirectly, as noted also by American 
authors, it contributed to settlement of problems by way of negotiations^.
The Apartheid policy of the Republic of South Africa was first 
brought before the Security Council in 1960, after the General Assembly, 
since 1946, had Apartheid on the agenda on a number of occasions, it 
has remained on the agenda of the Council ever since. From the second 
half of the 'sixties onwards attention was focussed on South-West Africa 
(Namibia), together with the developments in Southern Rhodesia (Zim­
babwe) merely because of the colonial régime maintained by the white 
minority with brutal force.
The Congo question became one of the outstanding issues not only 
of Africa, but of world politics as a whole. The question remained on the 
agenda of the Council from I960 till 1964 until the liquidation of the 
GNUC.
From the second half of the 'sixties onwards we could witness the 
birth of a new phase. The problems associated with the liquidation of 
colonialism may be split up into two distinct sets. The one is that of 
Apartheid and the case of South West Africa (Namibia) closely assoc­
iated with it and of Southern Rhodesia. All three matters virtually centre 
around racial discrimination and the violation of human rights rather than 
the maintenance of the classical system of colonization.
The second set of problems embraces those associated with the 
classical forms of colonialism, in the first place with the Portuguese 
colonies. Portugal, apart from suppressing her own colonies, constitutes 
a permanent threat to the neighbouring African states. This set of prob­
lems, includes, from the Stanleyville operation in 1964 onwards till the 
aggression against Guinea in 1970, all actions which have been launched 
with the conventional arms of intimidation and retaliation against the 
African states. In this connexion mention may be made of the armed 
actions in the Near East associated with the liquidation of the rem­
nants of the British colonial empire rather than the Arab-Israeli con­
flict, thus e.g. the British bombing raids against Yemen, etc.
The questions on the agenda of the Security Council linked up with 
the liquidation of the one or the other form of colonialism allow of drawing 
the following conclusions:
The historical process of the disintegration of the colonial system 
was in the first place one which passed of outside of CNO. The outcome 
was determined by the power of the movements of liberation rather 
than by the resolutions of the UN (if the process could mature to the 
stage of resolution at all). Within the UN by the side of the Security 
Council in this process important functions were discharged also bv the 
General Assembly and Trusteeship Council. In the questions under studv 
the Security Council operated with low efficacv. As a matter of fact
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the United Kingdom and France couid first with a "hidden veto", later 
on with an open "against" vote prevent radical actions from being under­
taken e.g. in Algeria or South Africa, or even Southern-Rhodesia.
Notwithstanding these symptoms retarding a wholesome process 
the statement may be made that with a few concrete measures, and the 
general political and moral weight of its debates the Security Council 
has also contributed to the gradual liquidation of the colonial system.
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In tiie preceding passages clearly loom up the overall picture of 
opinions and estimations of the Security Council and of suggestions for 
the course it should take. In the following we shall therefore refrain from 
an analysis of these opinions and estimations going into details. Instead 
we shall offer a schematic summary of the principal tendencies. As a 
preliminary we should like to call forth attention to three points. First, 
the opinions referred to may manifest themselves as official, govern­
mental viewpoints, and also as scientific or political public opinion. 
Second!v, no clear-cut line can be drawn between opinions characteristic 
of the two groups of states, in particular as far as public opinion is con­
cerned, here the two groups meet at several points. Thirdly, we have to 
underline that the term "third world" is inaccurate and cannot be consi­
dered a scientifically developed category. Nevertheless the term serves 
as an expedient indicating the group of states which in general may be 
described by two characteristics, viz. first, these countries do not belong 
to the military alliances of the Western or socialist countries, and, se­
condly, economically they may be considered developing states. Nor has 
the term "Western" to be accepted in the strictly geographical sense: 
even in the parlance of UNO the "W est" includes, in addition to Western 
Europe, e.g. Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of South Africa, etc.
a. The western capitalist countries, in particular in the beginning of 
the 'fifties, were inclined so to say "write o f f " among their political po­
tentialities the Security Council, and with all their efforts concentrated 
on the reinforcement of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
In the United States, however, the most rightist and most conservative 
circles were dissatisfied even with the policy giving priority to the General 
Assembly. So among others a group of politicians headed by former 
President Hoover would have favoured the creation of a United Nations 
Organization without the Soviet Union, a suggestion against which even 
John Foster Dulles, on realistic considerations, had to take a stand.
Western, mainly American action was directed in the first place 
against the Soviet Union, on which the West wanted to lay the blame for 
the "paralysis" or deadlock in the Security Council. Even at that time 
the Western powers abstained from launching a direct attack against 
the principle of the unanimity of the great powers, i.e. against the veto, 
but reproached the Soviet Union for the "obstructive" recourse to the
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veto, which it wng aliened the Soviet Union made use of contrary to the 
agreement reached in San i'rancisco. \\ tien t he Western powers sponsored 
the extension of the competence of the General Assembly thev at the 
same time resorted to a rattier interesting experiment: on the initiative 
among others of John foster Guiles the idea was raised and debated on 
of the introduction of the system of "weighted voting", a system which 
as they thought would imply both guarantees and advantages for the 
"W est".
W ith the introduction ol the system of weighted voting the principle 
of sovereign equality and one country — one vote implied in it would 
have been waived and the states members of the United Xations would 
bv a variety of criteria assigned to a number of categories. The one opi­
nion t hought the number of population should be accepted as a criterion, 
whereas others would have given priority to the national income, and even 
to the general political and military weight of the country. According to 
a variant the Security Council, or by its proposed new designation, Hxe- 
cutive Council, would have been composed of the representatives of the 
various categories of states. The veto would have been abolished, still 
voting would have organised so as to guarantee the majority of the count­
ries of major importance".
flic system of weighted votes has lost any serious support. Ongrounds 
of principle the proposal met even before with the firm opposition of 
the socialist states. The countries of the ..third world" stood up against 
the proposal partly on ground ol principle, partly because the large num­
ber of small states included in this group would forfeit their actual sig­
nificance in the General Assembly. Fventually after a thorough study 
the United States officially dropped the plan. A study of the Department 
of State, in 1963, with the aid of computers, in a number of variations 
demonstrated that in the event of the acceptance of anyone of the sugges­
ted criteria the weight ol votes ol small and medium countries in general 
in favour of the 1 nited States would drop. At the same time the United 
States too admitted that the system of weighted voting would defeat the 
principle of one state — one vote, and on considerations of principles it 
would be injurious to the interests of the United States to favour this 
system*".
Of the three western permanent members of the Security Council 
trance is the one which for years already consistently takes the field for 
a Security Council operating in conformity with the Charter. Undoubtedly, 
in particular when Gaullist policy asserted itself with true vigour France 
was aware of the adventages the Security Council meant for the reinfor­
cement ol the remnants of her lormer yraac/eMr. From the unfolding of 
the so-called financial crisis onwards and in particular in the XTXth 
session of the General Assembly, which passed off without a vote, even 
il on other grounds the French position in the matter of the preservation 
of the competence of the Security Council was essentially uniform with 
that ol the socialist countries. In the Security Council France often acts 
as a friend and supporter of the small states, and occasionally pronounces
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a moderate criticism on the United States, as was the case on t lie occasi­
ons of American aggression against the Dominican Republic.
The United Kingdom, although stiii sponsoring the idea of extending 
the competence of the General Assembly, was during the latter years 
often forced to have recourse to tier own veto. Like France the United 
Kingdom, too, enjoys a special status owing to her permanent members­
hip of the Council, at least in the United Nations, and therefore it is 
untihei v t hat she would move radical changes in t tie organization of UNO.
it appears as if the United States were reassessing lier earlier point 
of view. To this the United States have been prompted by a number of 
reasons. Before all the outcome of the ,.financial crisis" has taught the 
lesson that the socialist states cannot be isolated anymore, even in the 
General Assembly. Nor can every state be persuaded to accept the Ameri­
can interpretetion of the Charter. Secondly, although on very rare occa­
sions, the United States of America was outvoted, and it is not unlikely 
that in the future she would be forced to have recourse to the veto on 
manv more occasions than before. Gf late the American-Soviet negotiati­
ons outside UN, and in general the establishment of bilateral relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Cnion have considerably ad­
vanced cooperation between the two powers within the United Nations.
While the three Western powers have gradually waived their policy 
of a direct campaign against the Security Council, Japan has appeared 
on the scene with ideas of her own of a revision of the competence of 
the Securitv Council. Of the countries of the ,,third world" we lay stress 
on Japan, because for her political alignment and her position in world 
economics Japan is tied rather to the group of ..western and other count­
ries." At the same time as a matter of course Japan tries to act also on 
behalf of the Afro-Asian countries within the United Nations. Thus 
Japan is the principal seconder of the motion brought forward in the 
X X Y th  Session of the General Assembly, and also subsequently, suggest­
ing to make sure whether conditions as they are at present would permit 
the convention of a conference as foreseen by Article 100 for the revision 
o f the Charter. Obviously what Japan in the first place expects from a 
revision of the Charter is that in the one way or the other she might 
secure for herself a permanent seat in the Security Council, what undoub­
tedly may be considered the symbol of her status of a great power. In 
this connexion the news item of the Hungarian Press Bureau from Tokyo 
dated May 4, 1072. deserves special attention:
,.The Japanese foreign office has drawn up the outline of a revision 
of the Charter, which the foreign office wants to forward to Secretary- 
General Dr. Waldheim. The proposals are directed partly to limiting the 
veto of the permanent members of Security Council, partly to securing 
Japan's entry into the Security Council as permanent member. In the 
idea of Japan there should be no recourse to the veto when in the event 
of an armed conflict the United Nations contemplate the delegation of 
a fact-finding committee. According to Tokyo questions of international 
peace and security of outstanding importance should be discussed in the
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General Assembly rather than in the Security Council. This would prevent 
the permanent members of the Council from making use of their veto. 
In Japanese opinion it is a mistaken policy that the nuclear powers should 
at the same time be permanent members of the Securitv Council. There 
should a seat be secured for Japan, as a non-nuclear power. To ttiis end 
Japan is prepared to forgo the ve to "."
This news item of the Hungarian Press Bureau has been quoted here 
not merely to present an idea of the special endeavours of a state, viz. 
Japan, but also to allow an insight into the general feeling which unite a 
considerable part of the countries of the West the Third World as well as 
in their appraisal of the principal agencies of the UN. It should be noted 
that H. Kissinger after being nominated Secretary of State has also spo­
ken in favour of Japan's permanent membership on the Council.
On speaking of the general feeling we cannot omit making mention 
of non-official, scientific-social opinions. There has a number of books 
and papers been published on the future of UN and within it of the Secu­
rity Council and its functions. Here only three works will be quoted, 
Avhich on the whole sum up the different ideas which have been brought 
forward, ih e  one is the work of G. Clark — L. B. Sohn, whose title at 
the same time serves as the name of a prominent international association 
of lawyers. The second volume is in like way one published by American 
authors, Wilcox and Marcv, whereas the third work has a Frenchman as 
its author.
The good intentions of the authors, who for that matter have collec­
ted private as well as official opinion (in particular Wilcox and Marc-y) 
can't be called into doubt, it is beyond doubt, however, that a large 
portion of suggestions and proposals collected not only are unrealistic, 
but at the same time radically contradict the principles of international 
law and before all of the Charter of UN, in the first place the principle 
of sovereign equality. The much discussed and rejected idea of a ..world 
government " looms up in many suggestions. For the purpose of the pre­
sent study the following proposals and suggestions deserve special atten­
tion: abolition of the veto, the subordination of the Securitv Council to 
the General Assembly, submission of disputes of a legal character to the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of-Justice, which should be endo­
wed with absolute jurisdiction, recourse to the International Court of 
-Justice for the legal remedy of injurious resolutions of the Securitv Coun­
cil, etc. etc. Although these unrealistic ideas have not disappeared al­
together, still of late a more sober approach to the problems is making 
headway even in American literature. American authors are gradually be­
coming aware of the change in the power relations within the United Na­
tions and also of the responsibility of the United States for the efficacy 
of the operations of UN.'s
¿n If  now we consider the position taken by the countries of the 
,,third world ", or more precisely, of the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries, 
the following statements suggest themselves:
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Even at the expense of the risk of exaggerated generalization it 
may he said that the states of the ,.third world" are most in need for the 
United Nations. As a matter of fact the states of the two world systems 
by relying on their political, economic and military potentialities may 
find the appropriate forms for the successful enforcement of their foreign 
political concepts even outside the United Nations, in want of such po­
tentialities the countries of the ,.third world", in particular the non-alig­
ned countries, are making efforts to increase their political influence 
through the United Nations. In particular in the latter years these states 
are expecting aid from the United Nations before all for the liquidation 
of their economic backwardness. Still the expansion of the economic 
and development functions of the United Nations does not mean as if 
these countries were underrating the political functions. On the contrary, 
they are expecting dual political aid from the United Nations. First, in 
local or larger international crises these countries would prefer to apply 
to the United Nations for the restoration of peace rather than to anyone 
of the great powers or to the one or the other of the military systems. 
(Here it is not intended to pronounce a criticism of the position taken by 
these countries, merely its existence has been stated.) Secondly, they 
would like to make use of the United Nations for the liquidation of the 
remnants of colonialism and the suppression of the most revolting forms 
of racial discrimination.
The tenor of the critical remarks of the third world and its ideas de­
veloped in connexion with the United Nations follow from the character 
of this dual political task. The states of the third world would like to 
reinforce the United Nations, in the first place through strengthening 
the authority of General Assembly and through the limination of recourse 
to the veto in the Security Council. They would like to vest the resolutions 
of the General Assembly with binding force, and to provide a financial 
basis for future actions to be undertaken by the U ni ted Nations by ways 
and means not referred to in the Charter.
For reasons already known in the first question, i.e. the maintenance 
of peace, the countries of the ,,third world" before all come into conflict 
with the position taken by the socialist countries that actions for the 
maintenance of peace should be launched exclusively by a resolution of 
the Securitv Council. As regards the second question, i.e. the liquidation 
of colonialism, here the policy of the Western powers constitute the 
principal obstacle. Since in both instances the endeavours of the ,.third 
world" are frustrated by the principle of the unanimity of the powers, 
i.e. the veto, these countries are inclined, first, to consider the veto prin­
cipal bar to progress, and, secondly, to believe that it is the veto that is 
responsible for the stereotyped confrontation of the great powers and 
the small countries.
it  should be noted, however, that during the latter years the cam­
paign against the veto among the countries of the "third world" has abated. 
One by one these countries begin to recognize that the unanimity rule of the 
great powers not only reflects the political realities of the world, but
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at the same time safeguards their interests in the given instance. This 
change of opinion is particularly noticeable in the attitude of the Arab 
countries, still presumably India, too, will in the light of the crisis asso­
ciated with the birth of the Republic of Bengal (Bangladesh) revise hcr 
earlier policy envisaging the increase of the competence of the General 
Assembly to the prejudice of the Security Council.
Hence the ..third world" wants a more efficient United Nations and 
a more efficient Security Council. Experience little by little makes it 
clear to these countries that a modification of the present svstem as 
established by the Charter would not serve their interests. Yet we must 
not cherish illusions. The competence and organization of the Security 
Council, which we believe should remain as they are, will be exposed to 
criticism on the part of the ,.third world" for many years to come.
3. 77'e A'daacc q / /Ac ac/iri/ic-s q / /Ac 6'oMaci? /Ac
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Gn a{)proaching the end of the present study we should like to sum 
up the positive and negative features of the activities of the Security 
Council siac ira e/ ,s-/adm. At the same time we shall have to deal also 
w]th the prospects of the near future without, however, enlargin'' on 
..futurological" discussions.
bor drawing any conclusions the following questions will have to 
be answered:
\\ hat has not been translated into reality of the ideas expressed or 
implied by the Charter regarding the Security Council ?
How can the actual contributions of the Council, to the maintenance 
ol international peace and security be summed up ?
Have the ideas regarding the competence of the Security Council 
retained their validity, and if so to what extent ?
Docs the composition of the Security Council meet the exigencies 
of the changing world, with special regard to the permanent members?
Is the path to the establishment of a universal svstem of collective 
security open ?
If we choose a pcsscmistic and even ironic reply to the frist question, 
we should have to answer that practically nil has come true of the original 
ideas. After an objective analysis, however, the following may be stated:
1 he Security Council has not become the central agency of the svstem 
of collective security after the Second World War. This was the case not 
merely as if the pattern as shaped had not from the point of view of or­
ganization and principles been suitable for this responsibility. The Se­
curity Council has failed merely because no system of collective security 
has been created notably, for reasons already made clear. The Secu­
rity Council has proved to be a failure not only because of the frus­
tration ol the unanimity of the great powers, but also because in the new 
situation cases of the infringement of peace and aggression wholly diffe­
rent from those predictable at the time of the creation of the Council have
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manifested themseives. Instead of the forms and methods of Italian, 
German and Japanese aggressions eventually leading to the outbreak of 
the Second World War a period of local wars and of ideological poli­
tical conflicts and clashes has followed. No actual breach of peace took 
place in Europe as presumed. Yet it was Europe where with the creation 
of NATO the rigid confrontation of military alliances had its origin. 
Thus, with very few exceptions the provisions of Chapter V II of the Char­
ter have remained a dead letter. The sanctions decreed against Southern 
Rhodesia constitute an exception which lias been meant to liquidate the 
domestic oppressive rule of the white minority and not to put an end to 
the aggression of the one country against the other. The Security Council 
has failed to achieve any noteworthy results even in such an important 
field as disarmament.
On the ,,debit" side of the balance sheet of the activities of the 
Security Council not only the entries representing unsolvable cases are 
distressing. For definite historical and political reasons the Council could 
not deal with the Yiet-Nam conflict, or with the problems of Indochina 
in general. It was for the same reasons that the West Berlin question, and 
the German question as a whole could not be brought before the Council, 
and so the problems of European security, either. In many instances 
the Council had to content itself with the settlement of second-rate prob­
lems of international life.
¿1. I f  the actual achievements of the Security Council are placed in 
juxtaposition to the responsibilities of the Council as defined by the 
Charter, the balance struck will in fact be a meagre one. A small number 
of results may nevertheless be shown in the scope of Chapter VI, i.e. the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Still at an appraisal of the activities of 
the Council not the number of cases solved definitively to the satisfaction 
of the parties concerned will be decisive. What is of even greater impor­
tance is the permanent forum the Council has provided for the presen­
tation cif conflicting opinions, complaints and mutual accusations. As the 
means of multilateral diplomacy, if in modest way only, the Council could 
contribute to the winding up of centres of international tension. This 
function of the Council was much in the fore when bilateral diplomatic 
relations froze almost completely, like at the time of the Korean war, 
and the attempts to settle it peacefully. This role of a lightning rod has 
been described aptly by Secretary General U Thant on speaking of UNO 
yet with reference to the Security Council: "Quite apart from its more 
positive functions, the United Nations provides an invaluable repository 
and a safe target for blame and criticism which night otherwise be directed 
elsewhere. The Organisation has, during all its years and in many situati­
ons, performed a vital function as an international lightning rod A'
The Security Council has, however, contributed not only in general, 
but also in concrete cases to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. It had an undisputedly positive role in the advancement of the 
disintegration of the colonial system notwithstanding any adverse devel­
opment. W ithin its peace-maintaining activities the Council has contri-
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buted to the restoration of peace or at least to the localization of conflicts. 
These activities wiil speak for the Security Count i) even if certain traits 
in them are open to criticism. It may be stater!, however, that tins acti- 
vitv of tire United Nations cannot be efficacious, and cannot be resorted 
to unless the direct confrontation of the two world systems anti wit Inn 
them of the United States and the Soviet Union can be avoided.
c. it  is bevond dispute that the principal goal the Charter, viz. to 
spare the future generation the horrors of war is still valid, moreover that 
it has grown in significance in the shadow of nuclear warfare, it is also 
bevond doubt that the achievement of this goal calls for the cooperation 
of the great powers as before and also for (¡nick and efficacious action 
on behalf of the UN in conformity with Article 24. Thus the statement 
will hold that the cardinal provisions of the Charter have stood the test 
and that their possible nonenforcement can be accepted as a warning for 
their observance rather than an indication of their superfluity.'"
The answer to the question will not, however, depend on whether or 
not the provisions of the Charter may be considered being timely. The 
gist of the problem is whether in unison with the ideas of 1943 the Secu- 
ritv Council will in fact become the forum of cooperation of the great 
powers, or will it be relegated to a secondary, auxiliary position by the 
side of the hi- and multilateral, and other extra— UN negotiations of the 
great powers. Let there be no mistake about it: for our part we are fully 
aware of that bilateral relations are still the primary form of international 
contact, and even approve of the practice. This has to be stressed even in 
the faccof the progress the various forms of cooperation arc makingwithin 
the svstems of alliances, or regional or universal international organiza­
tions! Incidentally this is a legitimate and positive process. It is also quite 
natural that even when recourse will oftener be had to the Security 
Council, decisions wiil more likely be made in the different capitals and not 
in the UN Headquaters in New York. What still remains a question is 
whether the particular states, in the first place the great powers with 
permanent scats in the Security Council wiil prefer to make use of the 
Securitv Council for the coordination of their policy and the enforcement 
of the decisions they might reach.
In our opinion, the various states, in particular the great powers, 
seem to be inclined to the belief as if under present circumstances the 
odds were more in favour of the settlement of problems of world policy 
outside UN. without recourse to the Security Council. We shall refrain 
from analyzing the causes of this development. We shall merely refer to 
the following points determining the situation: The special political, mi­
litary and economic weight of the Soviet Union and the United States, 
and their primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace: the actual 
foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and her present relations 
to the Soviet Union: the fact that of the five permanent members of t he 
Security Council there are at the same time members of NATO: etc.
We cannot, however, agree with those who want to represent the 
bilateral relations existing between the powers as being some sort of a
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,.conspiracy", as suggested by the following quotation: ,,Now that the 
italancc of power is changing, however, democratic controi of foreign 
policy is waning. Multilateral diplomacy and the United Nations are 
being pushed aside and the emphasis now is on secret diplomacy at the 
meetings of the heads of great powers." (New Y ork Times, 1973. VI. 13.'") 
It should be.remembered that the authority of UNO touched bottom when 
the great powers were confronting one another in a hostile spirit, whereas 
the drafting of the Charter and the creation of the United Nations were 
made possible exactly by the agreement of the ,.three great", or the five 
great powers.
Hence we may answer the question we have put to ourselves In­
stating that the responsibilities and competences as defined by the Charter 
liave remained in their totality as before, still the degree of efficiencv will 
in the near future depend on the readiness with which those concerned 
will have direct recourse to the Security Council. We believe that this 
readiness will have to lie even greater in the coming years, because the 
dialectics of exactly the circumstances referred to before will have to 
lead to the method of multilateral relations and negotiations, to settle­
ments relying on compromises.
After this survey of the problems of a higher order we would comment 
on details of the problem of the competence of the Security Council as 
follows:
Frequent recourse to the application of Chapter V 11 of the Charter in 
its purity is unlikely in the near as well as distant future. Even on the 
assumption of the unanimity of the great powers it is not likely even in the 
event of a relatively "neutral" conflict, such as e.g. the armed clash of two 
African countries (see the case of Uganda and Tanzania) the Securit v Coun­
cil would in conformity with Article 39 define t he aggressor part v and accor­
dingly in con junction with the General Staff Committee send UN troops 
to the site. It is by far more likely that in such and similar cases the United 
Nations will make use of the one or the other of actions destined to main­
tain peace, as a matter of course by virtue of a resolution of the Security 
Council. Thus a slow process making acceptable certain elements of the 
peace keeping activities as a practical interpretation of the Charter cannot 
lie precluded altogether.
<7. As regards the composition of the Security Council the drafters 
of the Charter had in mind the then power relations of the world. Unlike 
the League of Nations, where membership of the Council lent a special 
status, in the United Nations a clear-cut line has been drawn between per­
manent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. Hy vesting 
the Soviet Union with the rights of the permanent members, the United 
Nations Organization has provided guarantees against making use of the 
Organization to the prejudice of the socialist countries, at least not with­
out the violation of the Charter (see the Korean war). Thus the partici­
pation of the leading powers of the two world systems has become the 
roaddio -sine yaa aoa of the survival of the Security Council.
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As regartls the institution of non-permanent membership it may be 
stated that the presence of non-permanent members is in agreement 
wit): the principle of sovereign equality. The non-permanent members, 
have not been allotted a subordinate role by the side of the permanent 
members: they take actively part in tire formulation of the resolutions, 
in the consultations between the different groups of states. The number 
of members as increased since 1!)05 is more in agreement with the principle 
of an equitable geographical distribution of memberships, although the 
Eastern Huropean, i.e. the socialist countries still have a single non- 
permanent seat only. The actual ten non-permanent seats, however, on 
the whole meet requirements, as the members elected to these seats in 
general also represent their regional groups. (Although nothing has been 
said of this representation in the Charter.) A further increase of the number 
of non-permanent seats is not advisable, first, because the Security Coun­
cil would be too large, and, secondly, the ratio of membership would 
change to the prejudice of the permanent members. (For the non-per­
manent membership and within it for the activities of the Hungarian 
People's Republic in the Security Council see the study of the same aut­
hor in Hagyar Jog.)'?
Problems of greater difficulty and complexity will crop up when it 
comes to speak of the permanent members of the Security Council. To 
begin with we may safely state that even in this connexion the Charter 
has proved to be durable. It may suffice to remember that the five per­
manent members are at the same time the powers possessing nuclear 
weapons. Even if nuclear armament is accepted as the common denomi­
nator of the five powers, it should be remembered that there are enor­
mous differences in the degree of armament among the five powers. 
Among them the United States and the Soviet Union rise above the others 
with their strategic and economic resources. The position of the United 
Kingdom ant 1 France has become considerably weaker, although at the time 
of drafting the Charter both powers stoodfor the golden age of colonialism. 
We cannot, however, ignore two important factors. First, both the United 
Kingdom and France, beyond their actual and by no means negligible 
resources, have considerable influence in economics, commerce, trade, the 
scientific and cultural life, and in several other fields. Secondly, we have 
to remember the new situation brought about with the extension of the 
European Fconomic Community. It would be wrong to interpret the 
entrv of the United Kingdom and of other countries as if by this a uni­
form. homogeneous Western European United States had been called to 
life. As a matter of fact even within the Community there will be for many 
years to come sovereign states of conflicting interests. It would not be 
proper, however, to make little of the process of integration, which will 
entail not only economic consequences, but whether we like it or not, 
also political consequences. In this meaning the claim of both the United 
Kingdom and France to a permanent seat in the Security Council has 
bevond doubt become stronger. In connexion with the permanent mem­
bership of the People's Republic of China we have already stated that
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objectively this was inevitable and besides a positive event even when at 
present, and probably in the near future, China will continue to cause 
difficulties, be nuisance to the socialist states and in particular liamper 
tlie Soviet Union in unfolding her activities in the United Nations.
If the ]<resent status of the five permanent members is regarded as 
acceptable, the question may be asked whether it would not be timely to 
establish further permanent seats. The reply to the question will partially 
be defined by what we consider the criteria of permament membership. 
As is known, neither the Charter, nor the San Francisco conference has 
given a clear-cut answer to this question. The only criterion, the one 
formulated in the Charter, is that the permanent member of the Security 
Council should be able to bear the responsibility conferred on it for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. In this there must, 
as a matter of course, be implied other criteria, such as the militarv and 
economic potential. Two further criteria should be taken into account. 
The one is the number of population, the other whether or not the member 
represents a definite region in both the geographical and political respects. 
These criteria should, however, be allotted a secondary role only by the 
side of those mentioned first.
What other countries may come into consideration as candidates for 
additional permanent seats in the Security Council should now be inves­
tigated in the light of what has been set forth before. In the first place 
Japan, India, or possibly Brazil and the German Federal Republic have 
been suggested for permanent seats. The names of Indonesia and Pakistan 
were also mentioned in the early 'sixties, however, under different historical 
circumstances.
Undoubtedly, Japan is the country which with its dynamic economic- 
growth appears t o satisfy best the criterion of economic potential. Simil­
arly strong is the case of the German Federal Republic. On the other 
hand, both countries, and owing to provisions of her constitution in partic­
ular Japan, represent no adequate military power. Still dependent on 
possible political decisions both may rank among the strongest military 
powers before long. There is much in favour of India, before all that 
India has the second largest population in the world. Still as regards her 
national economy and military power India is lagging behind the countries 
mentioned before. The position of Brazil is very much the same. Brazil 
would be called rather to represent the "prestige" of Latin America in 
the Council, something she was striving for already in Dumbarton Oaks.
Still it is not only the want of the one or the other criterion which 
makes the invitation of anyone of these countries on the Security Council 
arguable. The reception of the one or the other of these countries in the 
Security Council would upset the balance partly between the present 
permanent members, partly between the countries likewise figuring as 
candidates for a permanent seat, yet by-passed. Furthermore we have to 
reckon with the contingency that the present permanent members, 
which would have to ratify the amendment of the Charter decreeing the 
picrca.se of the number of permanent members, would exactly owing to
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t tic change in power relations, refrain from doing so. Therefore all objective 
and subjective factors considered the creation of new permanent seats in 
the near future do appear neither feasible, nor desirable, in the last 
resort such an increase of the number of permanent members would be ill- 
advised. for the greatest achievement in the Security Council would be 
the bringing about of unanimity of the present permanent members. The 
reception of new members might hamper this process. The amendment of 
the Charter as a whole in a positive sense and together with it the res­
umption of the question of permanent membership at an appropriate 
moment should be made the task of a new historical period.
It should be noted that all that has been said is not intended to 
justify western ideas of a quinqu or multipole world. What is meant 
here is in complete unison with the statement that " . . .  although in the 
international arena still the national states are the actors, an adequate 
idea of the international ¡tower relations and it) particular of the trends 
iti international life can be formulated only on the ground of the "system" 
approach, anti in no case on that of the "power" approach".**
Hence by way of summing up we may state that on realistic con­
siderations the Charter has left it to posterity to settle the problem how 
the structure of the Security Council may and can be changed so as to 
adapt it to changed conditions. This will, of course, be associated wit It 
a restatement of the provisions defining the functions and the compe­
tence of the Security Council.
c 1^ The Security Council was unable to make use of the regional 
organizations to the extent allowed by Chapter VIM of the Charter. On 
the other hand, however, exactly in this connexion the question may be 
asked, whether it is not the creation of regional systems of security thro­
ugh which the path will lead to the effectuation of universal collective 
security? Putting this question is wholly justified, because exactly these 
days efforts are it) full swing for bringing about security and cooperation 
on the European continent.
The ideas are well known of the times before the creation of the 
Cnited Nations Organization suggesting the regional approach to the 
problem of security and the formation of a central corporate body of the 
great powers, which would have done business like some sort of a sum­
mit organization. Would this have been the proper course ?
In our opinion the universal approach to collective security was the 
proper policy in the past, and lias remained so at present. We should 
not be misled by the circumstance that in the period of the cold war the 
military and political systems created at that time rendered a relative 
stability, in contradistinction to the incapacity of the United Nations 
and within them the Security Council, and their withdrawal to the back­
ground. First of all the organizations called to life did not represent 
systems of regional security, but the military and political organizations 
of two conflicting world systems, and so do today. Secondly, the relative 
stability was maintained by the equilibrium of power, or as occasionally 
called in the West, the "balance of mutual fear", and not by some sort
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of niutualtv isolated coHective security of the different regions. We 
shouid remember that at the beginning of the slow and tiresome path 
leading to the creation of the European system of security, the states of 
the two social systems wanted to maintain and reinforce, respectively, 
the Warsaw Pact and NATO until European coHective security has been 
brought about definitively. This is true and will remain so even when the 
Warsaw Pact from the very beginning has pledged itself to cease to 
exist automatically with the creation of European security.*"
AH that may be concluded from what has been said is, that the sys­
tems" of universal and regional security cannot be pitted the one against 
the other. United Nations as the organ of coHective security called to 
universality, cannot discharge this function until the cooperation of the 
two world systems has superseded military confrontation, on the prin­
ciple of peaceful coexistence. Before this lias been achieved, it would be 
futile to hope for the creation of regional security in either Europe or 
Asia in the presence of a world wide military confrontation. This will, 
however, hold also the other way round, as by advancing regional secu­
rity and cooperation we may contribute to the universal preservation of 
peace and securitv. On this consideration we cannot but admit the need 
for a slight modification of the original ideas of the Charter. The case is 
not one of a textual amendment: what is meant is a modification of the 
general approach to the problem of security. As a matter of fact the ori­
ginal idea was a system of completely centralized coHective security, with 
the Security Council as axis. However, experiences of the past years have 
shown that coHective security cannot be brougt about, unless through 
the interaction of the complicated phenomena of world politics. Hie 
combined action of the political organizations and the regional agreements 
of the two world systems plus of the United Nations is needed in order 
that we might save "succeding generations from the scourge of war, 
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. -"
In the system of coHective security of the future, the Security Council 
will be unable to discharge this noble function alone, still it may become 
an important component of the success of the venture translating the 
dreams of mankind into reality.
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РЕФЛЕКСИИ ПО ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ СОВЕТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ 
И ЕЕ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ
(РЕЗЮМЕ)
Настоящая статья отделена на следующие части:
¡.Главным тормозом в реализации намеченных целей является отсуствие 
сотрудничества великих держав.
2. Отражение столкновений двух мировых систем в Совете Безопасности.
3. Отражение распада колониальной системы в деятельности Совета Безопас­
ности.
4. Оценка и перспективы Совета Безопасности в отражении мнений стран ка­
питализма и третьего мира.
5. Баланс деятельности Совета Безопасности и его место в системе коллектив­
ной безопасноти будущего.
В этой части статьи, автор ищет ответ на следующие вопросы:
-  Какие из положений Устава, касающихся Совета Безопасности не были 
осуществлены?
-  В чем можно суммировать фактическое способствование поддержанию 
международного мира и безопасности?
-  Остались ли действующими положения компетенции Совета Безопасности 
и в чем?
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— Соответствует ли нынешний состав Совета Безопасности требованиям ие- 
прарывно меняющегося мира, уделяя особое внимание постоянным членам 
Совета?
— Мощно ли реализовать представления o создании универсальной коллек­
тивной безопасности?
INFLEXIO NS SCH L'ACTIVITÉ D P  CONSEIL DE 
SÉCURITÉ ET SES PERSPECTIVES
SUM M ARY
L 'étude se  d iv ise  aux parties su ivantes:
1. L 'obstaele principal de ia réalisation  des ob jectifs désignés: la m anque de la  c o ­
opération  parm i les grandes puissances.
2. Le reflet des co n flits  entre les deux systèm es m ondiaux dans l'a c tiv ité  du Conseil 
de Sécurité.
3. Le reflet de la liquidation  du sy stèm e colon ial dans l'a c tiv ité  du Conseil de Sécurité.
4. L 'appréciation du Conseil de Sécurité et ses perspectives au m iroir de l'op in ion des 
pays occidentau x e t  du tiers m onde.
5. La balance de l'a c tiv ité  du Conseil de Sécurité e t  son  lieu  dans le sy stèm e de la  
sécurité de l'avenir.
D ans cette  partie de l'é tud e, l'auteur cherche la réponse au x  questions su ivan tes:
— L esquelles des provisions de la  Charte relatives au Conseil de Sécurité n 'on t-e lles  
pas été  réalisées ?
— D ans quoi peut-on résum er la  contribution e ffec tiv e  du  Conseil au m aintien  de la 
paix  e t de la  sécurité internationales?
— L es provisions relatives à la com pétence du Conseil, on t-e lles resté va lid es et c o m ­
m ent ?
— E st-ce-q ue la com position  du Conseil de Sécurité correspond aux ex igences du  
m onde changeant, portant une a tten tion  particulière aux m em bres perm anents?
— E st-ce-qu'on  pourrait réaliser l'idée de la co llective  sécurité universelle?
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